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#### A. Interpretation - Economic engagement is long-term strategy for promoting structural linkage between two economies

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” [http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http:/polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf)

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

#### B. Violation – the plan is an economic inducement – engagement requires trade promotion

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### **C. Voting issue –**

#### **1. limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything**

#### **2. negative ground – trade promotion is vital for a stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan ground**

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#### Obama will hold off sanctions – capital is key

**Dennis 11/23**

Steven, Roll Call, Obama Faces Skeptical Congress as Iran Nuclear Deal Reached (Updated), 11/23/13, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/obama-announces-iran-nuclear-deal/

President Barack Obama has a sales job to do with Congress after he announced an interim deal Saturday night that will halt Iran’s nuclear program — although not dismantle it — in return for a partial rollback of sanctions.¶ Obama said in a statement from the White House that the agreement would “cut off Iran’s most likely paths to a bomb” and said Iran must work toward a comprehensive solution over the next six months or the full sanctions would resume.¶ “The burden is on Iran that its nuclear program will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,” Obama said.¶ He urged Congress to hold back on plans for a new round of sanctions, which lawmakers in both chambers have been pushing and could receive a vote after Thanksgiving.¶ “We will comtinue to work closely with Congress,” he said. “However, now is not the time to move forward on new sanctions, because doing so would derail this promising first step, alienate us from our allies and risk unraveling the coalition that enabled our sanctions to be enforced in the first place.”¶ Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking from Geneva, said that while the deal is a serious first step, it is not a triumphal moment and there is much work yet to do. But he said that he expects to be able to convince Congress to give the administration’s strategy a chance to work.¶ “I have great confidence in my colleagues in the Congress,” he said.¶ Senior administration officials on a conference call emphasized the limited benefits to Iran – of st most $6 or $7 billion over six months.¶ “Iran is not back in business,” one official said. The benefits “will not move the needle economically for Iran.”¶ Instant reaction from Republicans was skeptical.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is unpopular – costs PC

**NYT 13**

New York Times. “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to Economy” May 4, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

#### Capital key – prevents deal rollback

**Cockburn 11/11**

Patrick, author of Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, Why Iran’s Concessions Won’t Lead to a Nuclear Agreement, 11/11/13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/11/11/why-irans-concessions-wont-lead-o-a-nuclear-agreement/

On the other hand, the decision by President Obama not to launch airstrikes against Syria, Iran’s crucial Arab ally, after the use of chemical weapons on 21 August, has to a degree demilitarised the political atmosphere. This could go into reverse if Congress adds even tougher sanctions and threats of military action by Israel resume. Much will depend on how much political capital President Obama is willing spend to prevent prospects for a deal being extinguished by those who believe that confrontation with Iran works better than diplomacy.

#### Successful deal key to prevent war with Iran

**Shank and Gould 9/12**

Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

**Avery 11/6**

John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

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**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### Economic development perpetuates the commodification of the environment and North-South divide making violence inevitable

**Howard, Hume, and Oslender 07** (\*David Howard – PhD in Latin America Studies from the University of Oxford; he is a lecturer in Sustainable Urban Development at the University of Oxford, \*\*Mo Hume – PhD in Latin American studies from the University of Liverpool; she is a professor of Development and Latin American Politics (Department of Politics) at the University of Glasgow, and \*\*\*Ulrich Oslender – PhD in Hispanic Studies from the University of Glasgow; former research fellow at the University of Glasgow in the Department of Geography, November 2007, “Violence, fear, and development in Latin America: a critical overview”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25548278.pdf) //MD

Others, however, have criticised 'Mrs Brundtland's disenchanted cosmos' and the fact that sustainable development is still based on the capitalisation of nature, expressed through global views on nature and environment by those who rule, instead of through local respect for surrounding landscapes (Visvanathan 1991). And Sachs (1992) argues in his widely read Development Dictionary that notions of ecology are merely reduced to higher efficiency, while a development framework is still accepted as the norm. Visvanathan (1991: 384) calls for an 'explosion of imaginations' as a form of resistance to this dominant economism and essentially violent development framework: a call echoed by Peet and Watts (1996: 263-8) in their edited collection on 'liberation ecologies', which envisages 'environmental imaginaries' as primary sites of contestation, which are then articulated by social movements that contest normative visions and the 'imperialism of the imaginary'. In many ways, the very notion of development has been radically called into question, as the concept has been linked to neo-colonial intentions of the Global North to intervene in and keep control of the countries in the Global South. For Escobar (1995: 159), dominant development discourse portrays the so-called 'third world' as a space devoid of knowledge, a 'chronic pathological condition', so that the Western scientist ‘like a good doctor, has the moral obligation to intervene in order to cure the diseased (social) body'. This intervention is always a violent one: one that ruptures the cultural fabric, penetrates the colonised body, and inserts a homogeneous developmental reasoning, often extirpating resistant cultural difference. To break this cycle of violent developmentalism, Escobar (1995) calls for an era of 'post-development' as a necessary step for national projects of decolonisation and for the affirmation of truly emancipatory political projects of self-affirmation.

#### The alt is to reject US intervention in Latin America and decolonize the 1AC– this is key to interrupt the imperial underpinnings of the 1AC

**Taylor 12** - Lecturer in Latin American Studies BA University of London, Queen Mary MPhil University of Glasgow PhD University of Manchester, (Lucy, “Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America,” International Studies Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, 11 SEP 2012, 14, 386–400, Wiley Online Library)//A-Berg

The aim of this paper is to think differently about International Relations (IR) by thinking differently about the Americas. I write this piece as a Latin Americanist, and as such, I bring a particular geographical and disciplinary perspective to the question of power in the region, drawing on the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ perspective developed by Latin American academics. This perspective has an explicit political agenda which seeks to ‘‘place knowledge at the service of decolonization’’ as the Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronı ´l suggested (2005: 148). In this way, I join a struggle against gross inequalities of power, wealth, justice, and knowledge regimes on the global (and the local) stage by reflecting on IR from an intellectual place to the south and at the periphery of conventional thinking. More explicitly, I draw together insights from critical IR and coloniality theorizing in order to consider how thinking about the USA from Latin America might not only open decolonial perspectives on the country but also suggest decolonial strategies for IR. My aim is not to criticize US intervention in Latin America––many have spoken eloquently against its government’s imperialistic foreign policies––but to propose a different, perhaps complementary, strategy which aims to disturb US global hegemony from the inside out by questioning the idea of ‘‘America’’ as a unified, unproblematic, and settled settler society. It is precisely because the USA and the worldview that it promotes are central to IR that this contributes to a decolonial IR. Two important caveats are in order before I begin. Firstly, this article focuses particularly on indigenous experiences and it does not explore the equally important dynamics of injustice, racism, and inequality that emerge from the African-American experience. There are two key reasons for this. Most obviously, it would be impossible for me to do justice to both experiences in the confines of one journal article; I find myself already generalizing about indigenous societies which are extraordinarily varied. In addition, coloniality⁄ modernity theorists focus particularly on indigenous struggles and philosophies, making this the more obvious topic for discussion. For these reasons, I have decided to focus on Native American dynamics in the coloniality of power. Secondly, as a white European, I can make no claim to write from a colonized position myself. However, as a Latin Americanist, I hope to contribute insights which are anchored in intellectual activity outside the IR core––both academically and geographically––and in particular to reflect on the decolonial possibilities that Latin America presents for IR, given its relationship to the United States. Decolonial Strategies and Insights from IR What might it mean to decolonize IR? One of the most important things that we can do, according to decolonial IR scholar Branwen Gruffydd Jones, is to question the deep political, ontological, and historical foundations of the discipline, asking how it came to be configured as it is and what sort of politics and social world it produces as a consequence (2006: 7–9). Many critical and postcolonial IR scholars have taken up this challenge, writing from and about different geopolitical and intellectual places. My purpose here is to join that conversation by drawing the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ scholarship into the discussion (along with, for example, Rojas (2007) who focuses on the question of development). This body of work is highly relevant not only because it dovetails with existing critical IR but also because it refers explicitly to experiences and power relations in the Americas. Thus, coloniality scholarship makes a double contribution because it opens a way to think differently about the USA, locating its critique at the heartland of international relationships and International Relations.

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#### The United States federal government should condition substantially increasing its infrastructure investment toward Mexico through the North American Development Bank on ending human rights abuses by Mexican forces. The United States federal government should enact a periodic certification process to determine that abuses are effectively investigated and prosecuted.

#### Aid without human rights conditions send the message that US condones torture and violence – turns the aff and reinforces organized crime

**WOLA 10** – Washington Office on Latin America (“Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance,” 9/14/2010, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>) //RGP

However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

### adv 2

#### No warming extinction

**Carter et. Al 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](../../../../Marc/Desktop/Surviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable

**Doremus, 00** (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

#### SO MANY alt causes to dead zones – coastal and deep water ecosystems destroyed now

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

Yet another factor driving the decline of the oceans is the destruction of the habitats that have allowed spectacular marine life to thrive for millennia. Residential and commercial development have laid waste to once-wild coastal areas. In particular, humans are eliminating coastal marshes, which serve as feeding grounds and nurseries for fish and other wildlife, filter out pollutants, and fortify coasts against storms and erosion. Hidden from view but no less worrying is the wholesale destruction of deep-ocean habitats. For fishermen seeking ever more elusive prey, the depths of the seas have become the earth’s final frontier. There, submerged mountain chains called seamounts -- numbering in the tens of thousands and mostly uncharted -- have proved especially desirable targets. Some rise from the sea floor to heights approaching that of Mount Rainier, in Washington State. The steep slopes, ridges, and tops of seamounts in the South Pacific and elsewhere are home to a rich variety of marine life, including large pools of undiscovered species.

### adv 1

#### The economy is resilient and the impact is empirically denied

**Zakaria, ‘9** - Fareed (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2>]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### No impact to heg.

**Fettweis 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### Mexican economy resilient

**Nevaer, 09** [Lous—New America Media, News Report, “In Global Economic Crisis, Mexico Is Resilient”]

http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view\_article.html?article\_id=b8dc03d6f2792eba9e84392106c2c6f4>

MERIDA, Mexico – The economic crisis sweeping the globe has spared no nation, but some are showing remarkable resilience. Mexico's economic performance, for example, has shown tremendous strength. When the U.S. Federal Reserve extended a loan of $30 billion each to the central banks of Brazil, South Korea, Singapore and Mexico, Mexico did not touch those funds. It simply reinvested them in Treasury bonds, leaving them in accounts in New York. This is no accident. It stems from prudent economic policies implemented after the December 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso that sent the economy into a tailspin. At that time, President Ernesto Zedillo had been in office a few days, and his entire agenda was thrown into disarray by the crisis. The Clinton administration had to issue an emergency $50 billion loan –- which Mexico paid back ahead of schedule and with interest -– and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, helped craft a recovery program. It was a painful adjustment as budgets were slashed, fiscal restraint was implemented across the board, and the Mexican people saw their investments and savings diminish. That was 15 years ago, and the lessons learned the hard way are now paying off: Mexico's stock market fell 23 percent in 2008, the "best" performing major index at a time when the U.S. markets fell 38 percent and Russian markets collapsed by an astounding 70 percent. Last fall, some feared that the Mexican economy would not be able to escape the turmoil engulfing the United States, and the Mexican peso fell almost 30 percent vis-à-vis the American dollar. It has since recovered, although it has suffered a 20 percent devaluation since the economic crisis began last summer. These currency fluctuations reflect the fact that, because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, neither Mexico nor Canada have "decoupled" from the U.S. economy. There are several reasons for Mexico's economic resilience. One is the fiscal restraint that Zedillo initiated and that his successor, Vicente Fox, continued. Fox, a former corporate executive, made significant strides in eliminating Mexico's foreign debt. Mexico's current president, Felipe Calderon, has kept spending in line, even as revenues have increased. When disaster struck, Mexico had a balanced budget, almost no foreign debt and rising federal revenues, allowing it to intervene to stabilize prices. Mexico also dodged the housing speculation that brought its neighbor to its knees. Mexico's financial system has always been stringent in extending credit. Americans roll their eyes at the bureaucracy this entailed –- two forms of ID are required to open a bank account in Mexico; when customers request checks, they have to pick them up at the bank, where their signature and ID are verified; credit card applications must be made in person at the financial institution, and not over the phone or through unsolicited mail-in applications. As a result, "identity theft" is almost non-existent in Mexico, and it was nearly impossible for a housing bubble to emerge there. Another factor is the windfall oil profits – despite the sudden drop in oil prices. When oil peaked at $147 a barrel last summer, there was disbelief around the world: Would it shoot up to $200 or fall back? The conventional wisdom was that $100 a barrel for oil was the new reality going forward, and there was a frenzy to lock in prices through futures contracts. Mexican officials at Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, didn't believe that price was sustainable; their economic models indicated that, with slacking demand due to the recession, a price range between $60 and $80 was "sustainable." Other countries -– most notably Venezuela and Russia –- were more ambitious, and reckless. Both countries let spending explode, believing that they could finance anything they wanted. The economies in both countries today are in freefall. Mexico, by comparison, was prudent, saving the oil windfall, and Mexican traders implemented a strategy that hinged on the price of oil falling below the $60 to $80 range. "They're great traders," Phil Flynn, an analyst at Alaron Trading Corp., said of Pemex futures traders. "If the economy continues to slow, they're looking like geniuses." The world economy has more than slowed: It has hit a wall. And Mexico is collecting $90 to $110 per barrel today, for oil that is trading in the $38 to $45 range at the beginning of 2009. Having hedged its exports, Mexico is getting a premium, and a significant windfall that will total several billion dollars this year, enough to sustain social spending without massive federal deficits

#### No impact to oil shocks – other producing countries and good government policy prevent it – our claims are supported by empirics

**Kahn 11** (2/13. Jeremy. Journalist, formerly a Pew International Journalism Fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full> Pismarov)

Among those asking this tough question are two young professors, Eugene Gholz, at the University of Texas, and Daryl Press, at Dartmouth College. To find out what actually happens when the world’s petroleum supply is interrupted, the duo analyzed every major oil disruption since 1973. The results, published in a recent issue of the journal Strategic Studies, showed that in almost all cases, the ensuing rise in prices, while sometimes steep, was short-lived and had little lasting economic impact. When there have been prolonged price rises, they found the cause to be panic on the part of oil purchasers rather than a supply shortage. When oil runs short, in other words, the market is usually adept at filling the gap.¶ One striking example was the height of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. If anything was likely to produce an oil shock, it was this: two major Persian Gulf producers directly targeting each other’s oil facilities. And indeed, prices surged 25 percent in the first months of the conflict. But within 18 months of the war’s start they had fallen back to their prewar levels, and they stayed there even though the fighting continued to rage for six more years. Surprisingly, during the 1984 “Tanker War” phase of that conflict — when Iraq tried to sink oil tankers carrying Iranian crude and Iran retaliated by targeting ships carrying oil from Iraq and its Persian Gulf allies — the price of oil continued to drop steadily. Gholz and Press found just one case after 1973 in which the market mechanisms failed: the 1979-1980 Iranian oil strike which followed the overthrow of the Shah, during which Saudi Arabia, perhaps hoping to appease Islamists within the country, also led OPEC to cut production, exacerbating the supply shortage.¶ In their paper, Gholz and Press ultimately conclude that the market’s adaptive mechanisms function independently of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, and that they largely protect the American economy from being damaged by oil shocks. “To the extent that the United States faces a national security challenge related to Persian Gulf oil, it is not ‘how to protect the oil we need’ but ‘how to assure consumers that there is nothing to fear,’ ” the two write. “That is a thorny policy problem, but it does not require large military deployments and costly military operations.”¶ There’s no denying the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the US economy. Although only 15 percent of imported US oil comes directly from the Persian Gulf, the region is responsible for nearly a third of the world’s production and the majority of its known reserves. But the oil market is also elastic: Many key producing countries have spare capacity, so if oil is cut off from one country, others tend to increase their output rapidly to compensate. Today, regions outside the Middle East, such as the west coast of Africa, make up an increasingly important share of worldwide production. Private companies also hold large stockpiles of oil to smooth over shortages — amounting to a few billion barrels in the United States alone — as does the US government, with 700 million barrels in its strategic petroleum reserve. And the market can largely work around shipping disruptions by using alternative routes; though they are more expensive, transportation costs account for only tiny fraction of the price of oil.¶ Compared to the 1970s, too, the structure of the US economy offers better insulation from oil price shocks. Today, the country uses half as much energy per dollar of gross domestic product as it did in 1973, according to data from the US Energy Information Administration. Remarkably, the economy consumed less total energy in 2009 than in 1997, even though its GDP rose and the population grew. When it comes time to fill up at the pump, the average US consumer today spends less than 4 percent of his or her disposable income on gasoline, compared with more than 6 percent in 1980. Oil, though crucial, is simply a smaller part of the economy than it once was.¶ There is no denying that the 1973 oil shock was bad — the stock market crashed in response to the sudden spike in oil prices, inflation jumped, and unemployment hit levels not seen since the Great Depression. The 1979 oil shock also had deep and lasting economic effects. Economists now argue, however, that the economic damage was more directly attributable to bad government policy than to the actual supply shortage. Among those who have studied past oil shocks is Ben Bernanke, the current chairman of the Federal Reserve. In 1997, Bernanke analyzed the effects of a sharp rise in fuel prices during three different oil shocks — 1973-75, 1980-82, and 1990-91. He concluded that the major economic damage was caused not by the oil price increases but by the Federal Reserve overreacting and sharply increasing interest rates to head off what it wrongly feared would be a wave of inflation. Today, his view is accepted by most mainstream economists.¶ Gholz and Press are hardly the only researchers who have concluded that we are far too worried about oil shocks. The economy also faced a large increase in prices in the mid-2000s, largely as the result of surging demand from emerging markets, with no ill effects. “If you take any economics textbook written before 2000, it would talk about what a calamitous effect a doubling in oil prices would have,” said Philip Auerswald, an associate professor at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy who has written about oil shocks and their implications for US foreign policy. “Well, we had a price quadrupling from 2003 and 2007 and nothing bad happened.” (The recession of 2008-9 was triggered by factors unrelated to oil prices.)¶ Auerswald also points out that when Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast in 2005, it did tremendous damage to offshore oil rigs, refineries, and pipelines, as well as the rail lines and roads that transport petroleum to the rest of the country. The United States gets about 12 percent of its oil from the Gulf of Mexico region, and, more significantly, 40 percent of its refining capacity is located there. “Al Qaeda times 1,000 could not deliver this sort of blow to the oil industry’s physical infrastructure,” Auerswald said. And yet the only impact was about five days of gas lines in Georgia, and unusually high prices at the pump for a few weeks.

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#### I didn’t read all these

#### Human rights violations causes global instability and turns the case - Independently, we have a moral obligation to stop human rights abuses

**Clinton 12** (Hillary Rodham Clinton. Secretary of State. “Secretary Clinton: We Have a Moral Obligation to Confront Atrocities That Violate Our Common Humanity”. GENEVA. 24 July 2012. http://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/07/25/genocide-prevention/)//JuneC//

Thank you very much, and it’s a tremendous honor for me to be here on this occasion for such an important conference. I want to start by thanking Sara for that introduction, but much more than that, for her life’s work. She’s been involved with the Holocaust Memorial Museum since it was just a plan on paper. And she’s been here every step of the way shepherding it to the extraordinary heights it has assumed as a learning, teaching experience for 1.7 million people every single year, the vast majority of whom are young people.And I also want to thank Dr. James Lindsay, senior vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Mr. Michael Abramowitz, the director of the Committee on Conscience here at the museum. And as a point of personal privilege, let me also thank my longtime friend Mark Penn for doing this important research, and also Dr. David Hamburg, who – I don’t know if David is here, but David and I have been talking about these issues for longer than either of us care to remember, and much of his work and his thinking has been incredibly important.¶ Now, this gathering is yet another example of what the museum does so well. It brings us face to face with a terrible chapter in human history and it invites us to reflect on what that history tells us and how that history should guide us on our path forward. As Sara said when we were walking in this morning, human nature did not dramatically and profoundly change in 1945. We still struggle with evil and the terrible impulses and actions that all too often result in atrocities and violence and genocide. But I want to thank the Committee on Conscience for bringing attention to contemporary cases of extreme violence against civilians.¶ Let me begin by acknowledging that here in this museum, it’s important to note that every generation produces extremist voices denying that the Holocaust ever happened. And we must remain vigilant against those deniers and against anti-Semitism, because when heads of state and religious leaders deny the Holocaust from their bully pulpits, we cannot let their lies go unanswered. When we hear Holocaust glorification and public calls to, quote, “finish the job,” we need to make clear that violence, bigotry will not be tolerated. And, yes, when criticism of Israeli Government policies crosses over into demonization of Israel and Jews, we must push back.¶ Here at this museum and in the work that many of you do every day, we are countering hatred with truth. Thanks to the museum and institutions like it and scholars and academics and activists around the world, we have accurate histories. We have memorials and archives that record the stories of those who survived and those who did not. And because we know what happened, our call to action is that much clearer and compelling. Bringing that dark chapter into light helps clarify and sharpen what we mean when we say “never again.”¶ But despite all we have learned and accomplished in the last 70 years, “never again” remains an unmet, urgent goal. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, we have seen campaigns of harassment and violence against groups of people because of their ethnic, racial, religious, or political backgrounds, and even some which aimed at the destruction of a particular group of people, fitting the definition of genocide. The Khmer Rouge slaughtered those suspected of having a high school education or other supposed enemies. Saddam Hussein massacred Kurdish communities in northern Iraq. Entire villages in Sudan were wiped out by government-supported militias.¶ So in April, President Obama came to this place right here to underscore this Administration’s commitment to stopping the mass slaughter of civilians. He laid out a broad vision, declaring that fighting atrocities “must be the work of our nation and all nations.”¶ So today, I want to talk about our strategy for preventing and responding to these crimes and the specific steps we are taking, because we have seen the cost of inaction. In Rwanda, 800,000 people in a country of 7 million died in the 1994 genocide. I remember being in Rwanda with my husband when I was First Lady, listening to story after story from survivors about the loved ones they had lost and the horrors they had endured.¶ The world waited until the massacre at Srebrenica before acting in Bosnia. It took the stories of men and boys summarily executed by the hundreds in refugee camps, of women and girls dragged into fields and gang-raped by soldiers, of infants murdered because they would not stop crying. And yet we’ve also seen how decisive action can make all the difference.¶ Two years ago, I visited Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. When I arrived, throngs of men and women were lining the streets, clapping and waving flags and holding signs that said “Thank you America.” What the United States and our NATO allies did there more than a decade ago may not be fresh in the minds of every American, but I can assure you they certain – those memories are certainly fresh in the minds of the people of Kosovo. During that time, families lived in fear that they would be dragged from their homes, loaded onto trains and trucks to ethnically cleanse communities. If we had failed to intervene when we did, who knows how many faces would have been missing from those crowds?¶ So we do have a moral obligation to confront threats such as these, because they are violations of our common humanity. And as the poll you’ve just heard about shows, the American people share this commitment and believe we do have a responsibility to act. But it isn’t just the morally right thing to do. These crimes undermine stability in countries and across regions. They spark humanitarian crises and send refugees streaming across borders. They reverse economic progress and stymie growth for generations. They create bitter cycles of vengeance and retribution that can scar communities for decades.¶ President Obama was clear when he stated that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest as well as a core moral responsibility. So if a government cannot or will not protect its own citizens, then the United States and likeminded partners must act. But let me hasten to say this is not code for military action. Force must remain a last resort, and in most cases, other tools will be more appropriate through diplomacy, financial sanctions, humanitarian assistance, law enforcement measures.¶ The Administration has acted on this commitment. When the Qadhafi regime threatened a massacre in the city of Benghazi, we forged an international coalition to stop the assault. When Laurent Gbagbo violently clung to power in Cote d’Ivoire, we worked with UN partners to prevent the killing of innocents and to pressure him to relent. Now, he is standing before the International Criminal Court. When the Lord’s Resistance Army escalated its attacks against civilians and its brutal work of turning children into soldiers, we helped governments throughout Central Africa increase their efforts to go after the leaders, including Joseph Kony. And we continue to work with international partners to end the ongoing violence in Syria and usher in a democratic transition.¶ Now, why we have acted in these cases to try to stop violence, to contain events that could create even more terror may not be a hard question to answer. But the questions of exactly when and how to act are difficult. The fact is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Every situation requires a tailored and careful response. And today, I want to discuss a few specific practical steps that we are taking to combat genocide and mass atrocities, and I want to highlight two core ideas.¶ First, we are putting new emphasis on prevention, and second, we are seeking to expand the range of partners contributing to this cause because no one country can be effective alone. Let me start with prevention. You want to stop atrocities before they start. How do you know what to look for?¶ Well, genocides and mass atrocities don’t just happen spontaneously. They are always planned. Genocides are preceded by organized, targeted propaganda campaigns carried out by those in power. Extremist leaders spread messages of hate often disguised as something else – a song on the radio, a nursery rhyme, or a picture book. The messages filter down. Those in power begin to dehumanize particular groups or scapegoat them for their country’s problems. Hatred not only becomes acceptable; it is even encouraged. It’s like stacking dry firewood before striking the match. Then there is a moment of ignition. The permission to hate becomes permission to kill.¶ I remember going to Bosnia shortly after the Dayton accords were signed and meeting with a group of Bosnians. And one Muslim woman told me that when the violence started, she asked a neighbor whom she knew well, “Why are you doing this to us? Why is this happening?” She said that their families had known each other for many years, they had celebrated together at weddings, they had mourned together at funerals. And her neighbor replied, “We were told that if we don’t do this to you, you’ll do it to us first.”¶ The United States and our partners must act before the wood is stacked or the match is struck, because when the fire is at full blaze, our options for responding are considerably costlier and more difficult.¶ There are responsibilities for this effort now across our government from the intelligence community to the Defense Department to the Treasury to the State Department. And at the center of our work is our core asset, our diplomats and development experts.¶ First, we are making sure that our officers serving in at-risk countries are trained to understand the warning signs, to provide accurate assessments of emerging crises, to take the first mitigating steps. That might mean engaging governments and their supporters. It might mean talking to local media about growing violence. It might mean supporting those who are countering propaganda.¶ Second, we are putting technology to work advancing our prevention efforts. Because technology has changed the way we can detect and respond to mass atrocities. Until recently, it not only might happen, it did take days or weeks before outsiders knew about violence in a remote location. But now, a bystander with a cell phone and a YouTube account can show the whole world exactly what is happening.¶ So we are developing our own technological innovations. Our Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is working on a project to detect when governments use malicious software to target protestors and then warn those being targeted. We also want to educate citizens about the risks of certain types of electronic communications and the availability of more secure alternatives. And as President Obama announced here in April, USAID is partnering with Humanity United on a tech challenge to identify new, high-tech innovations that will aid this cause.¶ Third, we are enhancing our civilian surge capacity. We already have personnel trained to analyze conflicts and defuse potentially violent situations. Now we will be using those personnel to focus on atrocity prevention. We have deployed our Civilian Response Corps to countries such as South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, and Kyrgyzstan. We hope to train new teams to assess conditions on the ground, work with local governments to detect signs of impending atrocities, work with the local civil society and others who are representing populations at risk, and make recommendations to American officials on what we can do to prevent conflict. The new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations will deploy these personnel to address potential atrocities and empower citizens to learn how to resolve conflicts themselves.¶ Fourth, we’re deploying new tools through our National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security because women are often the first to know when their communities are in danger, and they are often the first to suffer. So we’re working with women at-risk in areas where they are to make sure there are early-warning systems responsive to sexual and gender-based violence. For example, we have supported a project in the DRC to build a community alert network to protect civilians, including from conflict-related sexual violence.¶ Fifth, we can directly pressure those who organize atrocities and cut off the resources they need to continue their violence. We can target sanctions against groups using information technology to further human rights abuses as we’ve done in Syria and Iran. And those responsible for such crimes will not find safe haven in our country because our government will now deny entry visas to anyone responsible for or suspected of planning or committing a mass atrocity.¶ Lastly, we want to deter atrocities by making clear that those who commit these crimes will be held accountable. Our work over the last three administrations to bring Milosevic and Mladic and Karadzic to justice for their crimes in the Balkans is a testament to that commitment. Our message to perpetrators must be that we do not forget, and there will be consequences.¶ But that brings me to the second part of our approach. We need to expand the circle of partners who can help prevent and respond to crises, because a problem of this scale takes the skills and resources of governments, the private sector, and civil society, all working together. It starts with a robust diplomatic effort. And we have to strengthen our ties and our cooperation with likeminded governments and organizations, because if more countries are looking out for warning signs and training their diplomats on prevention techniques, we will all be more responsive. I applaud the African Union for their increased attention on the crises across Africa and of ECOWAS for responding effectively to the violence from Sierra Leone to Cote d’Ivoire.¶ We’ll also be stepping up multilateral engagement to bring a greater focus on atrocity prevention. We’re working to strengthen the U.N.’s core peace and security tools. Under our leadership, the G8 Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Experts Group is focused on training and supporting peacekeepers to better identify and respond to violence that can and all too often does evolve into atrocities. To succeed, however, peacekeeping and special political missions will require the right resources, an understanding of the situation on the ground, strong leadership and personnel, and most importantly, the political will of member nations to back up these missions. That is often the most scarce commodity.¶ We’re expanding our connections with the private sector because companies that respect human rights foster an environment in which atrocities are less likely to occur. And when they do, the private sector must send a strong message by refusing to do business with those responsible. Banks should refuse to finance the sale or purchase of oil from such countries. Jewelers should refuse to traffic in blood diamonds. And there are numerous examples of how economic pressure can get the attention of leaders when all of the other efforts have not.¶ We also need to do more to support civil society. And I started the first-ever Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society around the world because we want to be in an emergency response mode with civil society groups that are standing up against violence and harassment.¶ We’re putting our elements of this strategy – prevention and partnership – into action through the Atrocities Prevention Board that President Obama announced here. Now, it might not be obvious that creating yet another government board will address a problem as entrenched as this. But the fact is a body such as this can drive the kinds of institutional changes that we envision. It can help galvanize efforts across our government to focus on prevention, to ensure that all our tools and resources are being put to good use. And it will give us an organizing principle, if you will, because it is difficult. There is so much information coming into this government on a second-by-second basis, and making sure it gets pulled together in one place where people can assess and analyze it and then suggest actions based on it is a challenge. So the board is the organizing entity that forces every part of the government to say, “This piece of information might be of use to the board. I better make sure it gets there.”¶ I particularly want to acknowledge our Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Maria Otero, who has represented the State Department so well on this board.¶ Now I understand very well that as much as we are doing to try to get ahead of these terrible events, we are clear-eyed about our challenges. How do we bring along countries that are reluctant to get involved or ensure that we don’t make a bad situation worse or provoke even more violence? So we have to approach this work with a large dose of humility and understanding.¶ But one thing must be noted: All nations have some influence and leverage that they can put to use if they are so engaged and focused. Even if nearly every country in the world takes a stand, we have seen recently how one nation or a small group of nations’ obstruction can derail our efforts. That has been the challenge we have faced in the UN Security Council over our efforts in Syria.¶ As the Assad regime continues its bloody assault on its own people, despite crippling sanctions, condemnation, increasing political pressure, they have found support, primarily from Iran, Russia, and China. More than a hundred other nations and organizations have made clear that Assad must step aside in order for a transition to begin. And we are supporting the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center, which is compiling evidence of serious abuses and violations of human rights. We’re supporting the UN Commission of Inquiry, which is gathering evidence about the crisis. We’re sending a message to the Syrian regime and making clear that there will be consequences for their actions.¶ But I have to say that we are also increasing our efforts to assist the opposition. This is a very complicated and difficult set of circumstances on the ground, and yet we know that the sooner it ends, the less violence there will be and the less chance for extremism to take hold. But it will be unfortunate if, indeed, the Assad regime and those around them decide that it’s an existential struggle for them and they will maintain and even increase the level of violent response.¶ We think about and worry about and work on these issues all the time. And if it were easy, we wouldn’t have to do things like have Holocaust memorials or atrocity prevention boards. But we are struggling with some of the deepest and most difficult impulses of human beings to protect themselves, to obtain power, to dehumanize others in order to enhance their own position and standing. And we have to do everything we can to keep pushing forward humanity’s moral response and effective efforts.¶ I want to close, though, by saying that not every mass killing is announced by the explosion of mortars or the exchange of gunfire or concentration camps. They aren’t always cases of governments slaughtering their own people. There are slow-motion crises that develop over time and don’t capture daily headlines and are even more difficult to address, like the use of rape as a weapon of war. In the eastern Congo, it’s estimated that 1,000 women and girls are raped every day, and it is a deliberate strategy used in the conflict there to dehumanize, to marginalize, to break the spirit of people. Or take the dehumanizing brutality in North Korean prison camps. They, I’m told, were joined by Shin Dong-hyuk, who was born in one such camp, and has made it his life’s work to bring the world’s attention to the conditions in his country. Or take the horrific problem of infanticide or, as it is rightly called, gendercide – families killing their own infant girls or allowing their baby and toddler daughters to die because their societies value only sons.¶ Now, whatever form atrocities take, however society explains, rationalizes, even tries to justify, we must be committed to preventing and ending all of these actions that truly dehumanize all of humanity. Now we have laid out our course for turning our commitment into action, but we recognize the plan we have laid out leaves many questions to answer, many ideas still to be formulated, and innovations to devise. But I am convinced we can make progress together. We have, in our lifetimes – those of us of a certain age – seen evil and hatred overcome. And in the tragic history that surrounds us here in this museum, we also see the stories of the heroes – the men and women who did the right thing, even when confronted and threatened by evil. And we’re inspired. We’re inspired by their courage and their resolve, what drove them to try to save a life.¶ That resolve continues to grow stronger. If one were to look at the great sweep of history, one has to believe that we can together overcome these challenges, that there will slowly but inexorably be progress. And at the root of that must be our resolve, and that resolve must never fail so that we can say and mean it, “never again.”¶ Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

#### National security and human rights are inextricably linked- protection of human rights would enhance global and national security

**Burke 4-**White, Deputy Dean and Prof. of Law at University of Pennsylvania, 2004 [William W, expert on international law and global governance, served in the Obama Administration from 2009-2011, 2004, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Harvard Human Rights Journal. Vol. 17. <https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/wburkewh/workingpapers/17HarvHumRtsJ249(2004).pdf>, Accessed 7/9/13- JM]

For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of human rights and the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking international human rights. While U.S. policymakers have been motivated at times by human rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example, President Bush’s 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to protecting basic human rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that “defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategic—as opposed to ideological or normative— argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post–Cold War period indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens’ human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states’ human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.

**The aff increases the economic inequality of the status quo – the conditions on human rights solves poverty in Latin America – only conditioning solves**

**Pogge 8 –** Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (Thomas, , “World Poverty and Human Rights” second edition, pg26-28, 2008)

Some hold (and I have been accused of holding) that we are harming the global poor insofar as we choose to treat them worse than we might – that only the best feasible treatment qualifies as non-harmful. My view as outlined in the preceding paragraph defines a notion of harm that is much more restrictive in six distinct respects. First, we are¶ harming the global poor only if our conduct sets back their most basic ¶ interests the standard of social justice I employ is sensitive only to¶ human rights deficits. Second, I am focusing exclusively on human¶ rights deficits that are causally traceable to social institutions. Third 1¶ am assigning moral responsibility for such a human rights deficit only¶ to those who actively cooperate in designing or imposing the relevant¶ social institutions - and only to them am I then ascribing compensatory¶ obligations to do their share toward reforming these social institutions¶ or toward protecting its victims. Fourth, I allow that our active¶ cooperation is harming the global poor only if it is foreseeable that this¶ order gives rise to substantial human rights deficits. 29 Fifth, I require¶ that these human rights deficits be reasonably avoidable in the sense¶ that a feasible alternative design of the relevant institutional order¶ would not produce comparable human rights deficits or other ills of¶ comparable magnitude. Sixth, this avoidability must be knowable: we¶ must be able to be confident that the alternative institutional design¶ would do much better in giving participants secure access to the objects¶ of their human rights.¶ I believe that we are involved in harming - and, more specifically,¶ in massively violating the human rights of - the global poor in this¶ quite restrictive sense. This does not mean that we must become hermits¶ or emigrants. We can compensate for our contribution to collective¶ harm also by contributing to efforts toward institutional reform or¶ toward protecting the victims of present institutional injustice. Focusing¶ on negative duties alone, I limit such compensatory duties to the¶ amount of harm one is responsible for by cooperating in the imposition¶ of an unjust institutional order. Setting aside any open-ended¶ positive duty to help the badly off, my appeal to a negative duty generates¶ then compensatory obligations that are tightly limited in range¶ (to persons subject to an institutional order one cooperates in imposing),¶ in subject matter (to the avoidance of human rights deficits), and¶ in demandingness (to compensation for one's share of that part of the¶ human rights deficit that foreseeably is reasonably avoidable through¶ a feasible alternative institutional design).¶ V Responsibilities and reforms¶ There is a simple two-part explanation for why our new global economic¶ order is so harsh on the poor. The design of this order is fashioned¶ and adjusted in international negotiations in which our governments enjoy a **crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise**. And our representatives in international negotiations **do not¶ consider the interests of the global poor** as part of their mandate. They¶ seek to shape each such agreement in the best interests of the people¶ and corporations of their own country. To get a vivid sense of the zeal¶ with which our politicians and negotiators pursue this task, you need¶ only recall to what incredible length the US government has gone to¶ shift of its share of the UN general budget onto other countries.¶ This hard-fought victory now saves the US some $60 million annually,¶ 20 cents per US citizen each year - or 87 cents when one adds the¶ similarly reduced US share of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations. This is one example, chosen only because it is so well known.¶ There are plenty of cases illustrating similar zeal by the representatives of other affluent states. Our new global economic order is so **harsh** on¶ the global poor, then, because it is formed in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance, or corruptibility¶ they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to tune each¶ agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent¶ states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but **rarely to¶ the weak**. The cumulative result of many such negotiations and agreements¶ is a grossly unfair global economic order under which the lion's¶ share of the benefits of global economic growth flows to the most¶ affluent states.¶ In many cases, our negotiators must know that, the better they¶ succeed, the more people will die of poverty. Our foreign and trade¶ ministers and our presidents and prime ministers know this, and so do¶ many journalists and academics, as well as the experts at the UN and¶ especially the World Bank, which bills itself as the official champion of¶ the global poor even while its management and decision-making are¶ controlled by the affluent states. After the terrorist attacks of September¶ 11, 2001, the President of the World Bank publicized his estimate¶ "that tens of thousands more children will die worldwide and some¶ 10 million more people are likely to be living below the poverty line of¶ $1 a day ... because the attacks will delay the rich countries' recovery¶ into 2002." Where do we find similar estimates about our tariffs, antidumping¶ duties, agricultural subsidies, and enforcement of intellectual¶ property rights in seeds and drugs? Or at least a reasoned denial that¶ we are causing grievous harms or that these harms are unjustifiable? After some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been slaughtered¶ in Rwanda in early 1994, the world took notice. The massacres¶ were widely discussed in the media, with many expressing dismay at the decisions by Western governments to avoid both the word "genocide"¶ and a peacekeeping operation. 32 Many believe that we should¶ have stopped the massacres, even if this would have meant risking the¶ lives of our soldiers and spending a few hundred million dollars or¶ more. We all felt a bit responsible, but bearably so. The deaths, after¶ all, were brought about by clearly identifiable villains, and we were¶ clearly not among them and also did not benefit from the killings in¶ any way. Deaths caused by global economic arrangements designed¶ and imposed by our governments are a different matter: These governments¶ are elected by us, responsive to our interests and preferences,¶ acting in our name and in ways that benefit us. **This buck stops with us**.

#### Unconditional engagement allows human rights abuses – the net benefit is a disad to the plan

**Shear and Archibold 13** - White House correspondent for The New York Times; reporter for The New York Times national desk (Michael and Randal, The New York Times, “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to Economy,” 5/4/2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>) //RGP

Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica. Michael D. Shear reported from San José, and Randal C. Archibold from Mexico City.

#### b) Nieto wants to cooperate on social equality and economic policy –

**Shoichet 5/2** – CNN Reporter (Catherine, CNN, “U.S., Mexican presidents push deeper economic ties; security issues still key,” 11/5/2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/world/americas/mexico-obama-visit/>) //RGP

Peña Nieto said his government remains committed to fighting organized crime, but that the United States and Mexico must "cooperate on the basis of mutual respect, to be more efficient in our security strategy that we are implementing in Mexico."¶ Obama stressed that the countries will continue to cooperate closely on security, but he didn't specify how.¶ "I agreed to continue our close cooperation on security, even as that nature of that close cooperation will evolve," he said.¶ It's up to the Mexican people, Obama said, "to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States."¶ In the meantime, he said, the United States remains committed to reducing the demand for drugs north of the border, and the southward flow of illegal guns and cash that help fuel violence.¶ "I think it's natural that a new administration here in Mexico is looking carefully at how it's going to approach what is obviously a serious problem," Obama said, "and we are very much looking forward to cooperating in any ways that we can to battle organized crime."¶ High-profile cartel takedowns were a hallmark of former President Felipe Calderon's tenure. Peña Nieto has vowed to take a different approach, focusing more on education problems and social inequality that he says fuel drug violence. The details of his policies are still coming into focus, and analysts say his government has deliberately tried to shift drug violence out of the spotlight.¶ Before Obama's arrival, a spate of news reports this week on both sides of the border detailed changes in how Mexico cooperates with the United States.¶ Under the new rules, all U.S. requests for collaboration with Mexican agencies will flow through a single office, Interior Minister Miguel Angel Osorio Chong told Mexico's state-run Notimex news agency.¶ It is a drastic change from recent years, when U.S. agents enjoyed widespread access to their Mexican counterparts.¶ Critics have expressed concerns that Peña Nieto's government will turn a blind eye to cartels or negotiate with them -- something he repeatedly denied on the campaign trail last year. On Tuesday -- two days before Obama's arrival -- his government arrested the father-in-law of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, head of Mexico's Sinaloa cartel and one of the country's most-wanted drug lords.¶ Speaking to reporters after his meeting with Obama on Thursday, Peña Nieto emphasized the importance of reducing violence, and also the importance of Mexico's relationship with the United States extending beyond the drug war.¶ "We don't want to make this relationship targeted on one single issue," he said. "We want to place particular emphasis on the potential in the economic relationship between Mexico and the United States."¶ To achieve that goal, Peña Nieto said, the presidents agreed to create a new high-level group to discuss economic and trade relations between the two nations. The group, which will include Cabinet ministers from both countries and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, will have its first meeting this fall, Peña Nieto said.¶ Imports and exports between the United States and Mexico totaled nearly $500 billion last year, and before Obama's arrival officials on both sides of the border said economic relations would be a focal point during the U.S. president's visit.¶ "When the economy in Mexico has grown, and people have opportunity, a lot of our problems are solved, or we have the resources to solve them," Obama said Thursday.¶ The emphasis on the economy Thursday was a significant shift, said Jason Marczak, director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas.

#### **c) [Reason why they want the plan/ warrant from cx]**

#### d) Nieto statements prove he wants to end HR violations

**Amnesty International 12** - global movement that campaigns to end grave abuses of human rights (Amnesty International Organization Annual Report, “Mexico: New President must break with legacy of human rights violations,” 12/18/2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-new-president-must-break-legacy-human-rights-violations-2012-12-18>) //RGP

Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto must implement immediate and concrete measures to tackle some of the country’s most pressing human rights issues, including abuses in the context of the public security crisis, said Amnesty International in an open letter. According to Amnesty International’s research, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice became routine during the previous administration. “Peña Nieto’s positive discourse regarding human rights, including commitments to move ahead with the General Victim’s Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances, are welcome but promises and good intentions are not enough to eradicate and prevent human rights violations,” said Javier Zúñiga, Special Adviser at Amnesty International. “A very good first step President Peña Nieto can take as as commander in chief of the armed forces is to instruct them to respect human rights or face the consequences. ” During the elections, Enrique Peña Nieto replied to an Amnesty International letter to candidates making a number of policy commitments if elected. “We want to remind the new President of his promises during the campaign and see concrete actions, including the development of a human rights programme in conjunction with all relevant sectors of society, including the judiciary, local authorities and human rights defenders, one that includes concrete proposals to tackle Mexico’s human rights crisis,” said Javier Zúñiga “Time is running out for Mexico. President Peña Nieto must not waste another six years with failed human rights policies and add more victims to those left by President Calderon.” Amnesty International’s letter details a number of priority issues which the new President must urgently address in order to strengthen respect and protection of human rights in Mexico, including: Public Security: Human rights abuses committed by the security and police forces in the context of operations to fight organized crime have become systematic over recent years, as has the lack of effective investigations into the abuses. Peña Nieto’s decision to support the General Victim’s Law is an important recognition of the rights of the thousands of victims of the violence, but it is essential that all public security initiatives protect human rights and justice in practice not merely in rhetoric.

#### e) They are politically and financially pressured to say yes

**Alberro, 05** - Dr. Alberro has been an arbitrator at the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the American Arbitration Association (“A US-MEXICO PARTNERSHIP IN ENERGY: A POLICY OF CONVENIENCE”, April 2005, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/MexicoPolicyBulletin.Energy.April.pdf)

All three processes – the NAEF securing funds and financing additional oil production, as well as the MDF investments- should be transparent and supervised by Mexican and North American stakeholders alike to insure that all investments are carried out with the highest standards, that all operations are subjected to benchmarking and that risks are minimized. Accountability to the international community is a condition sine qua non to bring financial institutions to the table. Currently, about 10 billion dollars of private financing flows annually to PEMEX through three mechanisms: • PIDIREGAS, public investment projects financed by the private sector in a manner that is consistent with constitutional restrictions; • CSM, multiple service contracts, have attracted over 4 billion dollars to the exploration and development of natural gas in northern Mexico; and • Direct indebtedness There is no magic bullet to finding 75 billion dollars, particularly because the PIDIREGAS and CSM are showing signs of fatigue, but increasing transparency suggests consolidating dispersed efforts. There are two basic mechanisms: 1. A significant portion of the project’s inputs will be imported from the United States. Thus a special facility should be created at the Export/Import bank for loans, insurances and/or guarantees to foster the participation of American businesses. A special task force should be created within the bank to streamline the approval process and the terms of these instruments should be tailored so that part of the risk is borne by the government. 2. Institutional investors and pension funds should be incentivized to hold instruments backed by oil revenues. The long-term, capital-intensive nature of this project suits the search for safe long-term returns by the dominant institutional investors in the United States-- public and private pension funds. Solid and safe returns guaranteed by oil revenues should be an attractive addition to their portfolio and would be no less profitable or secure than the Mexican government bonds they hold. A US government guarantee –or other form of enhancement- is necessary to facilitate the marketability of the new instruments. The task is ambitious but within the capabilities of Pemex’s and of Mexico’s Secretary of the Treasury if the international financial community subscribes to the reasonableness of increasing the oil platform and if Mexico pledges transparency and accountability. The $50 billion dollars of the 1995 Tequila crisis package shows the potential of combining financial creativity with political will. Credit rating agencies will have to be convinced to not downgrade Pemex. Exchange rate risk would be nominal because Mexican oil is traded in dollars: indeed credit agencies presently grant PEMEX ratings that are not significantly different depending on the currency of the instrument. Contractual-judicial risk could be mitigated by having contracts acknowledge the authority of US and international courts, as is currently the case. Lessening design and execution risk will require a bigger effort. A backlog of investment projects will have to be created and audited by experts to insure their reasonableness: international agencies could make important contributions to that goal, given their experience. The main obstacle to this endeavor is not the existence of constitutional restrictions but the lack of a social compact about the Mexican energy sector. This absence of a coherent long-term hydrocarbon strategy has weakened PEMEX, undermining the competitiveness of the Mexican energy sector, contrary to the goals of NAFTA’s energy chapter. The quest for higher levels of productivity and energy prices equivalent to those that would prevail in a competitive environment, has been replaced by ideological confrontations about privatization that have strengthened the hand of rent seekers.

#### a) Economic engagement specifically must be unconditional – means the perm and CP aren’t topical

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf

The provision of economic incentives to the private sector of a target country can be an effective mode of ‘unconditional’ engagement, particularly when the economy is not state dominated. In these more open economic climates, those nourished by the exchanges made possible under economic engagement will often be agents for change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other non-state actors, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, US engagement with China has nurtured sympathetic pockets, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure them. The only constraint on the scope and development of ‘unconditional’ engagement is the range of available collaborators in civil society or the private sector. Fortunately, globalisation and the explosion of economic entities that has accompanied it – while making economic isolation more difficult to achieve – presents a multitude of possible partners for unconditional engagement with non-state actors.

#### b) It severs should

**Summers 94** (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶ [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]¶ 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### c) It severs substantial

**Words and Phrases 25**

Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 7, p. 6738, **1925**

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

#### Worst case it takes 100 years

**Page 11**-Article Cites Study Conducted by the US National Science Foundation, Quotes Anreas Schmitner, Professor @ the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences [Lewis, The Register, Free Whitepaper-IBM System Networking RackSwitch G8264, “Global Warming Much Less Serious than Thought-New Science,” 11/25/2011, <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/25/runaway_warming_unlikely/>]

Climate scientists funded by the US government have announced new research in which they have established that the various doomsday global warming scenarios are in fact extremely unlikely to occur, and that the scenarios considered likeliest - and used for planning by the world's governments - are overly pessimistic. The new study improves upon previous results by including data from the remote past, rather than only examining records from recent times. "Many previous climate sensitivity studies have looked at the past only from 1850 through today, and not fully integrated paleoclimate data, especially on a global scale," says Andreas Schmittner, professor at the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State uni. "When you reconstruct sea and land surface temperatures from the peak of the last Ice Age 21,000 years ago – which is referred to as the Last Glacial Maximum – and compare it with climate model simulations of that period, you get a much different picture. "If these paleoclimatic constraints apply to the future, as predicted by our model, the results imply less probability of extreme climatic change than previously thought," Schmittner adds. The baseline assumption of climate science at the moment is that given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 compared to pre-industrial levels the most probable result is that the Earth would see a surface temperature rise average of 3°C - and that there would be a significant chance of much bigger, perhaps fatal rises. Schmittner and his colleagues' analysis says that the planet's climate simply can't be this sensitive to CO2 changes, however, or much more extreme events should have occurred at certain points in the past - and they did not. For instance, if the climate were sensitive enough that doubled CO2 could mean catastrophic warming, the low carbon levels seen 21,000 years ago should have resulted in an equally lifeless iceball planet. "Clearly, that didn't happen," Schmittner says. "Though the Earth then was covered by much more ice and snow than it is today, the ice sheets didn't extend beyond latitudes of about 40 degrees, and the tropics and subtropics were largely ice-free – except at high altitudes. These high-sensitivity models overestimate cooling." According to the new improved analysis, the most probable result as and when double CO2 occurs is actually a rise of just 2.3°C - only just above the 2°C limit which international climate efforts are seeking to stay within. Plainly there's no great need to fear a rise above 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2, as people currently do - in fact there's no likely prospect of getting near a 2°C temperature rise for a century or more at present rates of CO2 increase (rising about about 2 ppm/year at the moment from a level of 390-odd). And Schmittner and his colleagues' results show a much tighter grouping of possible futures, too, so the scope for way-out doomsday scenarios is hugely reduced. The Australian [quotes](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/climate-forecasts-exaggerated-science-journal/story-e6frg8y6-1226205464958) Schmittner as saying: "Now these very large changes (predicted for the coming decades) can be ruled out, and we have some room to breathe and time to figure out solutions to the problem." The new study [is published](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2011/11/22/science.1203513.abstract?sid=d47377ad-6df7-4f10-a1d7-ac371826abcf) in top-ranking boffinry journal Science. The research was funded by the US National Science Foundation. ®

#### That means intervening actors and tech solve

**Michaels 7** – Cato senior fellow (Patrick, 2/2, Live with Climate Change, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=7502)

Consequently, the best policy is to live with some modest climate change now and encourage economic development, which will generate the capital necessary for investment in the more efficient technologies of the future. Fortunately, we have more time than the alarmists suggest. The warming path of the planet falls at the lowest end of today's U.N. projections. In aggregate, our computer models tell us that once warming is established, it tends to take place at a constant, not an increasing, rate. Reassuringly, the rate has been remarkably constant, at 0.324 degrees F per decade, since warming began around 1975. The notion that we must do "something in 10 years," repeated by a small but vocal band of extremists, enjoys virtually no support in the truly peer reviewed scientific literature. Rather than burning our capital now for no environmental gain (did someone say "ethanol?"), let's encourage economic development so people can invest and profit in our more efficient future. People who invested in automobile companies that developed hybrid technology have been rewarded handsomely in the past few years, and there's no reason to think environmental speculators won't be rewarded in the future, too.

#### And, there’s no reason their species loss will snowball

**Sagoff, 97** (Mark, Pew Scholar in Conservation and the Environment and past President of the International Society of Environmental Ethics “Do we consume too much?” The Atlantic Monthly, June)

There is no credible argument, moreover, that all or even most of the species we are concerned to protect are essential to the functioning of the ecological systems on which we depend. (If whales went extinct, for example, the seas would not fill up with krill.) David Ehrenfeld, a biologist at Rutgers University, makes this point in relation to the vast ecological changes we have already survived. "Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut," Ehrenfeld has written, "extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bringing the eastern deciduous forest down with it." Ehrenfeld points out that the species most likely to be endangered are those the biosphere is least likely to miss. "Many of these species were never common or ecologically influential; by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine."

#### Biodiversity predictions are guess work – we don’t know how species are interconnected.

**O’Riordan and Kleeman, 02**(Tim O'Riordan and Susanne Stoll-Kleemann, Tim was the Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia and Susanne studied geography and social sciences at the Technical University of Berlin where she also received her PhD and she serves as Full Professor and Chair of Applied Geography and Sustainability Science at the University of Greifswald, 02. (“Biodiversity, Sustainability, and Human Communities: Protecting beyond the Protected.” Pg. 3. Columbian University Press. Questia. <http://www.questia.com/read/105051583?title=Biodiversity,%20Sustainability,%20and%20Human%20Communities:%20%20Protecting%20beyond%20the%20Protected>) QP

This planet is unique, at least as far as we will probably ever know. It contains life, which is maintained through self-regulating flows of energy and chemical connections, the science of which is well described by Tim Lenton (98).We also know that these webs of life are frayed (World Resources Institute 00). We are by no means clear as to how much these life-maintaining flows and fluxes are damaged. An assessment by the World Resources Institute (00: 9) entitled Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems (PAGE)indicates that there is still a fundamental ignorance of how this web joins, and of what it consists at any scale of analysis, or of human action. The Board on Sustainable Development of the US National Research Council (99: 208, 220–1) points out that this ignorance is all the more worrying because of the complex multiple causes and consequences of this disruption. One of the major threats to ecosystem goods and services is our lack of understanding about how specific ecosystem functions may change with ecosystem transformations. Another cause for concern is our hesitation about deciding on options for coping with and ameliorating these fundamental changes. A third limitation is lack of knowledge about, or incorrect valuation of, the 'worth' of ecosystem functioning for social well-being and economic advantage. A study attempting to calculate the 'worth' of ecosystem services(Costanza et al. 97)came up with a range of estimates on the basis of heroic estimates and ingenious assumptions. These estimates all exceeded the current value of total economic activity for the globe, on an annual basis, by a factor of up to threefold.Frankly there is no way of knowing how accurate this calculation is.What is revealing is that a clever monetary estimate indicates our scale of dependency or 'free riding' on the web of interconnected life. More relevant, perhaps, is the danger of trying to place a market-equivalent value on a mystery for which we should be more in awe than in arithmetic.

#### No extinction

**Easterbrook, 03** – senior fellow at the New Republic, 03 [“We're All Gonna Die!”, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=]

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

#### a) Chemical pollution – directly comparative

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

The oceans’ problems start with pollution, the most visible forms of which are the catastrophic spills from offshore oil and gas drilling or from tanker accidents. Yet as devastating as these events can be, especially locally, their overall contribution to marine pollution pales in comparison to the much less spectacular waste that finds its way to the seas through rivers, pipes, runoff, and the air. For example, trash -- plastic bags, bottles, cans, tiny plastic pellets used in manufacturing -- washes into coastal waters or gets discarded by ships large and small. This debris drifts out to sea, where it forms epic gyres of floating waste, such as the infamous Great Pacific Garbage Patch, which spans hundreds of miles across the North Pacific Ocean. The most dangerous pollutants are chemicals. The seas are being poisoned by substances that are toxic, remain in the environment for a long time, travel great distances, accumulate in marine life, and move up the food chain. Among the worst culprits are heavy metals such as mercury, which is released into the atmosphere by the burning of coal and then rains down on the oceans, rivers, and lakes; mercury can also be found in medical waste. Hundreds of new industrial chemicals enter the market each year, most of them untested. Of special concern are those known as persistent organic pollutants, which are commonly found in streams, rivers, coastal waters, and, increasingly, the open ocean. These chemicals build up slowly in the tissues of fish and shellfish and are transferred to the larger creatures that eat them. Studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have linked exposure to persistent organic pollutants to death, disease, and abnormalities in fish and other wildlife. These pervasive chemicals can also adversely affect the development of the brain, the neurologic system, and the reproductive system in humans. Then there are the nutrients, which increasingly show up in coastal waters after being used as chemical fertilizers on farms, often far inland. All living things require nutrients; excessive amounts, however, wreak havoc on the natural environment. Fertilizer that makes its way into the water causes the explosive growth of algae. When these algae die and sink to the sea floor, their decomposition robs the water of the oxygen needed to support complex marine life. Some algal blooms also produce toxins that can kill fish and poison humans who consume seafood. The result has been the emergence of what marine scientists call “dead zones” -- areas devoid of the ocean life people value most. The high concentration of nutrients flowing down the Mississippi River and emptying into the Gulf of Mexico has created a seasonal offshore dead zone larger than the state of New Jersey. An even larger dead zone -- the world’s biggest -- can be found in the Baltic Sea, which is comparable in size to California. The estuaries of China’s two greatest rivers, the Yangtze and the Yellow, have similarly lost their complex marine life. Since 2004, the total number of such aquatic wastelands worldwide has more than quadrupled, from 146 to over 600 today.

#### b) Overfishing

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

Another cause of the oceans’ decline is that humans are simply killing and eating too many fish. A frequently cited 2003 study in the journal Nature by the marine biologists Ransom Myers and Boris Worm found that the number of large fish -- both open-ocean species, such as tuna, swordfish, and marlin, and large groundfish, such as cod, halibut, and flounder -- had declined by 90 percent since 1950. The finding provoked controversy among some scientists and fishery managers. But subsequent studies have confirmed that fish populations have indeed fallen dramatically. In fact, if one looks back further than 1950, the 90 percent figure turns out to be conservative. As historical ecologists have shown, we are far removed from the days when Christopher Columbus reported seeing large numbers of sea turtles migrating off the coast of the New World, when 15-foot sturgeon bursting with caviar leaped from the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, when George Washington’s Continental army could avoid starvation by feasting on swarms of shad swimming upriver to spawn, when dense oyster beds nearly blocked the mouth of the Hudson River, and when the early-twentieth-century American adventure writer Zane Grey marveled at the enormous swordfish, tuna, wahoo, and grouper he found in the Gulf of California. Today, the human appetite has nearly wiped those populations out. It’s no wonder that stocks of large predator fish are rapidly dwindling when one considers the fact that one bluefin tuna can go for hundreds of thousands of dollars at market in Japan. High prices -- in January 2013, a 489-pound Pacific bluefin tuna sold for $1.7 million at auction in Tokyo -- make it profitable to employ airplanes and helicopters to scan the ocean for the fish that remain; against such technologies, marine animals don’t stand a chance. Nor are big fish the only ones that are threatened. In area after area, once the long-lived predatory species, such as tuna and swordfish, disappear, fishing fleets move on to smaller, plankton-eating fish, such as sardines, anchovy, and herring. The overexploitation of smaller fish deprives the larger wild fish that remain of their food; aquatic mammals and sea birds, such as ospreys and eagles, also go hungry. Marine scientists refer to this sequential process as fishing down the food chain. The problem is not just that we eat too much seafood; it’s also how we catch it. Modern industrial fishing fleets drag lines with thousands of hooks miles behind a vessel, and industrial trawlers on the high seas drop nets thousands of feet below the sea’s surface. In the process, many untargeted species, including sea turtles, dolphins, whales, and large sea birds (such as albatross) get accidentally captured or entangled. Millions of tons of unwanted sea life is killed or injured in commercial fishing operations each year; indeed, as much as a third of what fishermen pull out of the waters was never meant to be harvested. Some of the most destructive fisheries discard 80 to 90 percent of what they bring in. In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, for every pound of shrimp caught by a trawler, over three pounds of marine life is thrown away. As the oceans decline and the demand for their products rises, marine and freshwater aquaculture may look like a tempting solution. After all, since we raise livestock on land for food, why not farm fish at sea? Fish farming is growing faster than any other form of food production, and today, the majority of commercially sold fish in the world and half of U.S. seafood imports come from aquaculture. Done right, fish farming can be environmentally acceptable. But the impact of aquaculture varies widely depending on the species raised, methods used, and location, and several factors make healthy and sustainable production difficult. Many farmed fish rely heavily on processed wild fish for food, which eliminates the fish-conservation benefits of aquaculture. Farmed fish can also escape into rivers and oceans and endanger wild populations by transmitting diseases or parasites or by competing with native species for feeding and spawning grounds. Open-net pens also pollute, sending fish waste, pesticides, antibiotics, uneaten food, diseases, and parasites flowing directly into the surrounding waters.

#### c) Invasive species

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

Relatively new problems present additional challenges. Invasive species, such as lionfish, zebra mussels, and Pacific jellyfish, are disrupting coastal ecosystems and in some cases have caused the collapse of entire fisheries. Noise from sonar used by military systems and other sources can have devastating effects on whales, dolphins, and other marine life. Large vessels speeding through busy shipping lanes are also killing whales. Finally, melting Arctic ice creates new environmental hazards, as wildlife habitats disappear, mining becomes easier, and shipping routes expand.

#### d) Industrial trawlers

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

Today, fishing vessels drag huge nets outfitted with steel plates and heavy rollers across the sea floor and over underwater mountains, more than a mile deep, destroying everything in their path. As industrial trawlers bulldoze their way along, the surfaces of seamounts are reduced to sand, bare rock, and rubble. Deep cold-water corals, some older than the California redwoods, are being obliterated. In the process, an unknown number of species from these unique islands of biological diversity -- which might harbor new medicines or other important information -- are being driven extinct before humans even get a chance to study them.

#### e) Warming

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

As if all this were not enough, scientists estimate that man-made climate change will drive the planet’s temperature up by between four and seven degrees Fahrenheit over the course of this century, making the oceans hotter. Sea levels are rising, storms are getting stronger, and the life cycles of plants and animals are being upended, changing migration patterns and causing other serious disruptions. Global warming has already devastated coral reefs, and marine scientists now foresee the collapse of entire reef systems in the next few decades. Warmer waters drive out the tiny plants that corals feed on and depend on for their vivid coloration. Deprived of food, the corals starve to death, a process known as “bleaching.” At the same time, rising ocean temperatures promote disease in corals and other marine life. Nowhere are these complex interrelationships contributing to dying seas more than in fragile coral ecosystems. The oceans have also become more acidic as carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere dissolves in the world’s water. The buildup of acid in ocean waters reduces the availability of calcium carbonate, a key building block for the skeletons and shells of corals, plankton, shellfish, and many other marine organisms. Just as trees make wood to grow tall and reach light, many sea creatures need hard shells to grow and also to guard against predators. On top of all these problems, the most severe impact of the damage being done to the oceans by climate change and ocean acidification may be impossible to predict. The world’s seas support processes essential to life on earth. These include complex biological and physical systems, such as the nitrogen and carbon cycles; photosynthesis, which creates half of the oxygen that humans breathe and forms the base of the ocean’s biological productivity; and ocean circulation. Much of this activity takes place in the open ocean, where the sea and the atmosphere interact. Despite flashes of terror, such as the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004, the delicate balance of nature that sustains these systems has remained remarkably stable since well before the advent of human civilization. But these complex processes both influence and respond to the earth’s climate, and scientists see certain recent developments as red flags possibly heralding an impending catastrophe. To take one example, tropical fish are increasingly migrating to the cooler waters of the Arctic and Southern oceans. Such changes may result in extinctions of fish species, threatening a critical food source especially in developing countries in the tropics. Or consider that satellite data show that warm surface waters are mixing less with cooler, deeper waters. This reduction in vertical mixing separates near-surface marine life from the nutrients below, ultimately driving down the population of phytoplankton, which is the foundation of the ocean’s food chain. Transformations in the open ocean could dramatically affect the earth’s climate and the complex processes that support life both on land and at sea. Scientists do not yet fully understand how all these processes work, but disregarding the warning signs could result in grave consequences.

#### AND, we know they will say Florida ecosystem key – but all these factors affecting Florida coast now

Brian M. **Boom** - 08.14.20**12** Director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden. “Biodiversity without Borders Advancing U.S.-Cuba Cooperation through Environmental Research” <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders> ///ZABD///

The most urgent environmental problems requiring bilateral action are broadly classified as disasters—both those that occur naturally and those that are man-made. Hurricanes are the clearest examples of shared natural disasters. During the twentieth century, 167 hurricanes struck the U.S. mainland. Of these, 62 were major (categories 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale). During the same period, 36 hurricanes, half of which were major, made landfall over Cuba. Because many hurricanes—Katrina and Ike being twenty-first century examples—strike both countries, there exists a shared need after such disasters to respond to the negative effects, including environmental problems created by rain, wind, and storm surges.¶ Most major hurricanes occurring in the Caribbean during the past century have resulted in documented extensive perturbations of shallow-water marine ecosystems, particularly to coral reefs, seagrass beds, and coastal mangroves.2 Aside from physical damage to such ecosystems from more turbulent water, hurricanes can also negatively impact water quality. On land, hurricane damage to ecosystems can be even more severe than in the ocean. For example, damaged native vegetation will possibly be more prone to colonization by exotic, noxious species such as Australian pine and Brazilian pepper.3 While Cuban and U.S. scientists have shared motivation to assess, monitor, and remediate the marine and terrestrial ecosystems that are damaged by hurricanes, they currently cannot do so.¶ Man-made environmental disasters, such as oil and natural gas leaks, can likewise be of shared concern to the Cuban and U.S. governments. The Gulf of Mexico is a rich source of oil and gas and will remain so for decades to come. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there exist nearly 4,000 active oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico off the U.S. coastline. Cuba also has plans for new oil and gas platforms off its northern coast.4 Given the near- and long-term implications of gas, oil, and chemical dispersants on the Gulf of Mexico’s biodiversity, it is imperative for the economic and ecological wellbeing of both Cuba and the United States that exploration is pursued with enhanced safeguards to avoid the mistakes of past disasters, such as the dramatic explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.¶ While Cuba and the United States are signatories to several international protocols for cooperation on containment of oil spills, there is scant cooperation between them on this front—although there were at least some low-level meetings between the countries after the Deepwater Horizon blowout.5 Given the potential of currents in the Gulf of Mexico to disperse spills from off the coast of one country to the waters and shores of the other, there were ongoing concerns about the possible reach of the disaster. Fortunately, relative to its potential, the Deepwater Horizon spill remained mostly contained.¶ However, with increased drilling in the area, including deep wells, more than luck will be needed to avert future disasters. Even if oil and gas leaks or spills are restricted to Cuban or U.S. waters, the negative environmental impacts can be important regionally. The two nations’ shared marine ecosystem is the foundation for the mid Atlantic and Gulf Stream fisheries. Many important commercial and sport fish species breed and feed in Cuban waters. So destruction of Cuban mangroves and coral reefs will impact stocks of species such as snapper, grouper, and tuna, along with myriad other animals, plants, and microbes that spend different parts of their life cycles in the territorial waters of each country.6¶ Given that urgent environmental problems can arise rapidly and harm the economic and ecological health of the United States and Cuba, it is imperative that there should be a mechanism for rapid, joint response to these shared threats.¶ Emergent, Shared Environmental Problems¶ Thankfully, urgent, shared environmental problems involving the United States and Cuba are not everyday occurrences. Nonetheless, every day there are numerous environmental issues of concern to both countries that are of great importance in the medium to long term. Such problems center on the need to study, monitor, and assess the status of organisms and ecosystems that functionally exist in both countries.¶ A complex mosaic of coral reefs, seagrass beds, and mangroves knit together the marine and coastal ecosystems. Some of the most extensive, best preserved coral reefs in the Wider Caribbean Region occur in Cuban waters, and extensive coral reefs parallel the Florida Keys in U.S. waters. Cuba has the largest extent of mangrove forests in the Caribbean, about 4,000 km², and Florida’s southwestern coast supports mangrove forests comprising about half the extent of those in Cuba. Seagrass meadows occur in shallow waters of both countries, stabilizing sea bottom sediments that could otherwise threaten coral reefs and providing breeding, feeding, and shelter grounds for myriad marine animals, plants, and microbes.7¶ These ecosystems are threatened increasingly by habitat modification, the impact of tourism, overexploitation of marine fishes and other commercial seafood resources, the ramifications of climate change and rising sea levels, and pollution from land-based sources (e.g., unsustainable agricultural and forestry practices) and ocean-based sources (e.g., cruise ship waste). Increasing tourism especially threatens coral reefs. Despite some positive measures taken by the cruise industry in recent years, more cruise ships in the region still mean greater potential stresses to the marine and coastal environments. In addition to these and other shared ecosystems, many marine and terrestrial species are shared by Cuba and the United States. Examples include migratory, invasive, endangered, and disease vector species.

#### Lastly, they will claim that just preventing Cuba from drilling will solve the problem – not so much – need to have collective world focus to prevent overfishing, pollution and warming as well as oil drilling. They will say they are at least better than the status quo – however, the DA risk means we outweigh their ability to solve a minute sliver of ocean biodiversity.

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

A WAY FORWARD Governments and societies have come to expect much less from the sea. The base lines of environmental quality, good governance, and personal responsibility have plummeted. This passive acceptance of the ongoing destruction of the seas is all the more shameful given how avoidable the process is. Many solutions exist, and some are relatively simple. For example, governments could create and expand protected marine areas, adopt and enforce stronger international rules to conserve biological diversity in the open ocean, and place a moratorium on the fishing of dwindling fish species, such as Pacific bluefin tuna. But solutions will also require broader changes in how societies approach energy, agriculture, and the management of natural resources. Countries will have to make substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, transition to clean energy, eliminate the worst toxic chemicals, and end the massive nutrient pollution in watersheds. These challenges may seem daunting, especially for countries focused on basic survival. But governments, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and businesses have the necessary experience and capacity to find answers to the oceans’ problems. And they have succeeded in the past, through innovative local initiatives on every continent, impressive scientific advances, tough environmental regulation and enforcement, and important international measures, such as the global ban on the dumping of nuclear waste in the oceans. So long as pollution, overfishing, and ocean acidification remain concerns only for scientists, however, little will change for the good. Diplomats and national security experts, who understand the potential for conflict in an overheated world, should realize that climate change might soon become a matter of war and peace. Business leaders should understand better than most the direct links between healthy seas and healthy economies. And government officials, who are entrusted with the public’s well-being, must surely see the importance of clean air, land, and water. The world faces a choice. We do not have to return to an oceanic Stone Age. Whether we can summon the political will and moral courage to restore the seas to health before it is too late is an open question. The challenge and the opportunity are there.

#### Institutions ensure bounce back

**Somerville 08** - Glenn . "Paulson: Economy resilient but Fed move helpful." Reuters. 22 Jan. . <http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080122/bs_nm/usa_economy_paulson_dc>

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on Tuesday he was confident the U.S. and global economies were resilient but welcomed an emergency rate cut by the Federal Reserve as a helpful move. ADVERTISEMENT The U.S. central bank cut benchmark U.S. interest rates by a steep three-quarters of a percentage point while Paulson while still answering questions after addressing a Chamber of Commerce breakfast meeting. Paulson had earlier acknowledged the U.S. economy has slowed "materially" in recent weeks but, despite a meltdown in global stock prices, insisted that the global economy had "underlying resiliency" that would let it weather the storm. The U.S. Treasury chief initially looked surprised when a Chamber of Commerce official said the Fed had just cut rates in a relatively rare move between meetings of its policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee, but praised the action. "This is very constructive and I think it shows this country and the rest of the world that our central bank is nimble and can move quickly in response to market conditions," Paulson said. The U.S. Treasury chief, who headed Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs before taking over Treasury in 2006, said the $145-billion short-term stimulus package that President George W. Bush was asking Congress to work on was needed to minimize the impact of a U.S. economic slowdown. "We need to do something now, because short-term risks are clearly to the downside, and the potential benefits of quick action to support our economy have become clear," Paulson said. But early signs were that Bush's call for bipartisan action -- and a relatively positive Congressional response to it -- were not calming financial markets but might actually be fanning fears that the economy was at greater risk of toppling into recession than officially acknowledged. Stock markets around the world sank sharply on Monday, when U.S. markets were closed for the holiday in observance of slain civil rights leader Martin Luther King's birthday. Paulson tried to reassure that there was reason to feel confident in the U.S. economy's long-term prospects, notwithstanding severe problems in the housing sector and other credit-market strains. "The U.S. economy is resilient and diverse," he said. "It's been remarkably robust and it will be again." He added: "The unemployment rate remains low and job creation continues, albeit at a modest pace. The structure of our economy is sound and our long term economic fundamentals are healthy."

#### Flexibility and policy adaptation prevent collapse.

**Behravesh, 06** (Nariman Chief economist and executive vice prez @ global insight, 2006, “the great shock absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'”, Newsweek, p. lexis)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

#### Decline doesn’t cause conflict - interdependence

**Gelb 10 -** Leslie H., President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations; was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, November/December 2010, “GDP Now Matters More Than Force,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6

To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars. In the past, U.S. enemies--such as the Soviet Union--would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations. Given the receding threat of great-power war, leaders around the world can afford to elevate economic priorities as never before. To be sure, leaders throughout history have pursued economic strength as the foundation of state power, but power itself was equated with military might. Today, the prevailing idea is that economic strength should be applied primarily toward achieving economic--not military--ends. Money is what counts most, so most nations limit their spending on standing armies and avoid military interventions. What preoccupies most leaders is trade, investment, access to markets, exchange rates, additional riches for the rich, and a better life for the rest. This trend is plain among the rising regional powers known as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and among such others as Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Although these countries' leaders have major security concerns--such as India with regard to Pakistan--their paramount objective has become economic strength. For most, economic growth is their prime means of fending off internal political opposition. China makes perhaps the best case for the primacy of economics. Although it might emerge as a spoiler decades hence, Beijing currently promotes the existing economic order and does not threaten war. Because Beijing has been playing the new economic game at a maestro level--staying out of wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business--its global influence far exceeds its existing economic strength. China gains extra power from others' expectations of its future growth. The country has become a global economic giant without becoming a global military power. Nations do not fear China's military might; they fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.

#### Studies go neg.

**Miller, 2k** – Professor of Administration at the University of Ottawa (Morris, Interdisciplinary Science Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2000, May 21st 2010, KONTOPOULOS)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

# 1nr

#### a) No new sanctions yet proves Obama PC succeeding

**Dyer 11/20**

Geoff, Financial Times, Obama in plea to postpone new Iran sanctions, 11/20/13, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/585195a2-516f-11e3-9651-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lKtMLrat

Barack Obama made a personal appeal to leading senators on Tuesday to postpone new sanctions on Iran.¶ The move came on the eve of crucial nuclear talks. However, the US president still faces fierce opposition from many Republicans in Congress.¶ The US administration had initially appeared to win some political breathing space over its nuclear negotiations after a leading Republican senator left a meeting with Mr Obama and said that no new sanctions were likely until at least next month.¶ However, by the evening a group of six Republican senators not at the meeting had introduced a new sanctions measure which accused the administration of being “deeply naive” in the way it was negotiating with Iran and called for Tehran to halt all enrichment of uranium.¶ The amendment to the annual Pentagon funding bill introduced on Tuesday evening was authored by Senator Mark Kirk and was also backed by Mitch McConnell, the leader of the Republicans in the Senate.¶ Capping another day of fierce lobbying in Washington over the Iran talks and new disagreements between the US and Israel, the amendment could set up a political confrontation between the White House and its Iran critics in Congress if it is put up for debate.¶ The Obama administration has warned that new sanctions on Iran could scupper the ongoing talks with the country over its nuclear programme, which many western governments believe is designed to eventually produce a nuclear weapon.¶ The new amendment was introduced just hours before diplomats from the US and six other world powers meet senior Iranian officials in Geneva to discuss an interim agreement, which would freeze important parts of Iran’s nuclear programme in return for modest sanctions relief, in order to buy around six months to try to negotiate a long-term deal.¶ Iran will be negotiating with the US, UK, Russia, China, France and Germany.¶ US officials have said that an agreement is “close”, but 10 days ago talks broke up without a deal despite high expectations.¶ In his effort to forestall new congressional action against Iran, Mr Obama met 10 leading senators from both parties on Tuesday. Although some of the senators said they disagreed with the administration’s approach, the initial response appeared to win some respite for Mr Obama.¶ Bob Corker, the senior Republican on the foreign affairs committee who has been a big critic of the negotiations, said after the meeting that the Senate would not pick up a new sanctions bill that has already passed the House of Representatives until after the Thanksgiving holiday at the end of this month at the earliest.¶ A Senate aide added that given the short calendar in December because of the Christmas holidays, little movement was expected before January.¶ Mr Corker also said that no Iran sanctions amendments were likely to be attached to a forthcoming Pentagon funding bill, which had been mooted by some senators as another route for new punitive measures against Iran.¶ John McCain, the Arizona Republican and another regular critic of Mr Obama’s foreign policy, also said he did not expect new sanctions immediately.¶ “You always have to listen to the president of the United States when he asks you to do something,” he told the Washington Examiner. “Of course we want to seriously consider doing what he wanted, especially in the midst of some serious negotiations.”¶ However, Mr Kirk’s amendment threatens new restrictions on Iran’s ability to access overseas funds and to acquire precious metals if it does not halt all uranium enrichment – which is also one of the central demands of the Israeli government.¶ “This proposal will give our diplomats the increased leverage they need to get a good deal at the negotiating table – a deal that peacefully brings Iran into full compliance with its international obligations,” said Mr Kirk.

#### b) Obama can sell the deal

**Keck 11/8**

Zachary, The Diplomat, An Offer the U.S. Can’t Refuse?, 11/8/13, http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/11/08/an-offer-the-u-s-cant-refuse/

For one thing, the deal would be so one-sided in favor of the P5+1 that it shouldn’t be difficult for the Obama administration to sell at home. Moreover, as reported yesterday, U.S. legislation allows the president to use a national security wavier to unfreeze funds for up to 180 days without congressional approval. Congress could, in line with Sen. Corker’s proposal, try to remove this waiver authority before the U.S. was able to unfreeze the funds for Iran to transfer back to Tehran.¶ For this plan to succeed, a lot would have to happen in the time that the Treasury Department would need to unfreeze the funds. Both Houses of Congress would have to introduce, debate and pass bills. If they weren’t the same bills, they ‘d have to go to conference, reconcile the bills, then pass them again. This could theoretically be done quickly with enough Congressional support. However, the White House would have at least some allies on the Hill who could use any number of tactics to help drag this process out. Notably, even members of Congress publicly supporting the removal of the waiver could secretly cooperate with the White House in delaying the process.¶ Once both Houses passed the same bill it would be sent to the president who would have to decide whether to sign or veto it. The president would likely take his sweet time in trying to determine whether to sign the bill or not. While he was “weighing this decision,” the Treasury Department could go into overdrive in unfreezing the funds for Iran. In all likelihood, then, even if things went this far the president could likely unfreeze the funds without having to veto the bill Congress sends him.¶ In the worst case scenario, the president may have to invest some political capital in the deal. He would have little choice but to do so, however, given the repercussions of failing to honor America’s commitments.

#### c) PC is the key remaining question

**Mousavian 10/18**

Seyed Hossain, Research Scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. He served as head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's National Security Council from 1997 to 2005 and spokesperson of Iran's nuclear file 2003 to 2005, Al-Jazeera America, The road to finalizing a nuclear deal with Iran, 10/18/13, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/18/iran-nuclear-talksgenevauraniumenrichment.html

These ongoing talks have the potential to become a historic moment for the U.S., Iran and the international community. However, to ensure their progress, President Obama must do two things. First, he must resist pressure from hawkish members of Congress, Israel and lobbying groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and United Against Nuclear Iran. And second, he must include significant sanctions relief in the final agreement with Iran. While Iran and the international community are ready for a final deal, the question remains whether Obama has the will to buck the hawkish pro-Israel lobby and the political capital to end sanctions.

#### d) Obama PC is key to prevent new sanctions

**Rothkopf 11/12**

David, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, This Deal Won’t Seal Itself, 11/12/13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/this\_deal\_won\_t\_seal\_itself\_obama\_nuclear\_talks\_iran

No, even the Iranians should be happy with the delay... and not just for the cynical reason that any delay buys them the time they want and need to advance their nuclear weapons program. They also very much want sanctions relief, and to get it, they need the deal to win support from the U.S. Congress. Given the efforts of multiple forces to block the deal, this will mean the Obama administration and the president himself will have to systematically engage opponents in a way they seldom do on anything. Winning support on Capitol Hill and with the American people for such a deal is potentially the president's next big domestic political test. Failure on this after the failure to win support for his Syria efforts, the blowback from the NSA scandal, and his unsteady and confusing Egypt policies would be a big setback for the president during his second term, a period in which chief executives often turn to foreign policy to shape their legacies.¶ Of central concern to those domestic and international skeptics and opponents of any kind of rapprochement with Iran will be how the administration will ensure any deal is being adhered to and whether they have the resolve to punish Iran for any missteps or misrepresentations. If the President and his team can make a compelling case that they do, and then such a deal is certainly a risk worth taking. However, if the deal is seen as a dodge, as a way to avoid testing the president's resolve to do whatever is necessary to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, or even as a way to simply punt the hard questions associated with Iranian nukes to the next Oval Office occupant, then few will or should support what would amount to simply papering over one of the Middle East's great problems.¶ In short, the most critical component of this deal is not the words drafted by diplomats but what lies in the heart of the Iranians and the president of the United States. If Iran reverses past patterns and actually complies, the deal could be part of a game-changing reduction of tension that all in the region should welcome. But because that is a change without precedent and one that goes against the grain of decades' worth of Iranian behavior, as well as the character and commitment of the president of the United States, it is even more important to its success. If the Iranians believe President Obama is resolved to enforce it swiftly and decisively, it may work. If they think he will be reluctant to take tough enforcement measures, if they think he can be played -- either because he wants the legacy of an apparently successful deal or because he simply is loath to run the risk of costly, dangerous military action against Iran -- then history suggests they will play him (much as past U.S. leaders have been played in other such "deals" as was the case with North Korea).

#### Engaging Mexico is politically divisive

**Wilson 13**

Christopher E., Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars , January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Kills political capital

**Farnsworth and Werz 12**

Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, and Michael, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, The United States and Mexico: The Path Forward, 11/30/12, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/11/30/46430/the-united-states-and-mexico-the-path-forward/

On the economic front, the success of the new Mexican administration’s economic reform and growth agenda is a core interest of the United States. A number of policy fields will be crucial to create a successful North American growth model and will elevate the transactional partnership with Mexico to a strategic relationship much like the United States enjoys with Canada. To achieve this goal, both countries must address a number of issues simultaneously.¶ The creation of jobs will play a central role in domestic politics in both countries. U.S-Mexican trade needs to be encouraged in the border region and beyond. To achieve this, the U.S.-Mexican border needs to be more permeable and allow more crossings at lower cost.¶ To secure energy independence, both countries need to prioritize research and development investments to ensure that technologies that facilitate access to shale gas—such as horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracking—do not adversely affect the environment. This is a necessary step to move forward with the development of massive North American shale gas resources—a potential strategic game-changer.¶ Mexican states along the U.S. border are official observers in the Western Climate Initiative, joining California and four Canadian provinces. The federal governments in both the United States and Mexico should take aggressive steps to make it more feasible for these Mexican states to become full partners in the initiative to achieve meaningful reductions in carbon pollution and move toward greater U.S.-Mexican cooperation on future North American pollution cuts.¶ Both countries need to expand their economic relations with Asia and Europe. President-Elect Peña Nieto sees China as an important future partner for economic growth. Both Mexico and Canada were invited in June to join the negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership—an important if belated step. Both should also be included at the very beginning of discussions with Europe—should they occur as has been rumored—toward the creation of a free trade zone in the Atlantic. Such trade negotiations would provide an added means for the three North American economies to build cooperation.¶ The war against cartels and gangs involved in the illegal drugs trade continues to rage on both sides of the border, although indications of progress include a reduction in violence, cleaned-up cities, and increasing professionalization of the Mexican security forces. Achieving a reduction of violence will be a key challenge for President-Elect Peña Nieto, with street protests demanding as much. Judicial reform is moving forward, albeit slowly, but Mexican authorities still rely too greatly on confession by apprehended suspects and have deficits in the acquisition and use of intelligence. This fight needs to be framed as a joint challenge, emphasizing the co-responsibility of the United States, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has expressed several times.¶ The re-launch of a U.S.-Mexican bilateral commission would be an important vehicle to institutionalize cabinet-level discussions across the broad range of issues that affect our countries and maybe trilateralize along with Canada from time to time. Tone and perception count a lot in the bilateral relationship. In addition, both sides should establish permanent working groups to help change the image and perception of Mexico in the United States and vice versa. Such an engagement in public diplomacy could include messaging and outreach to counter the often-distorted perception of Mexican society in the United States.¶ The election of Enrique Peña Nieto and the re-election of President Obama mean that the U.S.-Mexican relationship has a unique opportunity to grow closer and bring numerous benefits to both sides of the border. To fully appreciate this unique opportunity, both sides must invest political capital and be prepared to engage domestic public opinion when it comes to explaining why our countries are united by much more than a fence.